

## CRYPTOGRAPHY OVER TWISTED HESSIAN CURVES OF THE RING $\mathbb{F}_Q[\epsilon]$

Abdelâli Grini <sup>1</sup>, Abdelhakim Chillali, and Hakima Mouanis

**ABSTRACT.** Let  $\mathbb{F}_q$  be a finite field of  $q$  elements, where  $q$  is a power of a prime number  $p$  greater than or equal to 5. In this paper, we will present twisted Hessian curves cryptography over the local ring  $\mathbb{F}_q[\epsilon]$ , where  $\epsilon^2 = 0$ . The motivation for this work came from the observation that cryptography plays an important role in providing data security. In a first time, we describe these curves defined over this ring. Then, we give an application of twisted Hessian curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In other we give an example of encrypted and decrypted messages.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In [4] Bernstein et al. have defined the twisted Hessian curves over a field, then in [1, 2] we studied these types of curves on a local ring  $\mathbb{F}_q[\epsilon]$ ,  $\epsilon^2 = 0$ . In this work we will give applications of twisted Hessian curves cryptography over the local ring  $\mathbb{F}_q[\epsilon]$ , where  $\epsilon^2 = 0$ .

Let  $\mathbb{F}_q$  be a finite field of order  $q = p^m$ , where  $p \geq 5$  is a prime number and  $m$  is a positive integer, such that  $-3$  is not a square in  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . We consider the quotient ring  $R_2 = \mathbb{F}_q[X]/(X^2)$ . Then the ring  $R_2$  is identified to the ring  $\mathbb{F}_q[\epsilon]$ ,  $\epsilon^2 = 0$ , i.e:

$$R_2 = \{a + b\epsilon/a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q\}.$$

---

<sup>1</sup>corresponding author

2020 *Mathematics Subject Classification.* 11T71, 14G50, 94A60.

*Key words and phrases.* Twisted Hessian curves, Finite Ring, Cryptography.

We consider the twisted Hessian curve over the ring  $R_2$ , which is given by the equation:

$$aX^3 + Y^3 + Z^3 = dXYZ,$$

where  $a, d$  are in  $R_2$  and  $a(27a - d^3)$  is invertible in  $R_2$ .

## 2. NOTATIONS

Lets  $a, d \in R_2$  such that  $a(a - 27d^3)$  is invertible in  $R_2$ .

We denote the twisted Hessian curve over the ring  $R_2$  by  $H_{a,d}(R_2)$  and we write:

$$H_{a,d}(R_2) = \{[X : Y : Z] \in P^2(R_2) \mid aX^3 + Y^3 + Z^3 = dXYZ\}.$$

We denote by  $\pi$  the canonical projection defined by

$$R_2 \mapsto \mathbb{F}_q$$

$$a + b\epsilon \mapsto a$$

**Theorem 2.1.** Let  $P = [X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1]$  and  $Q = [X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2]$  two points in  $H_{a,d}(R_2)$ .

(1) Define:

$$X_3 = X_1^2Y_2Z_2 - X_2^2Y_1Z_1,$$

$$Y_3 = Z_1^2X_2Y_2 - Z_2^2X_1Y_1,$$

$$Z_3 = Y_1^2X_2Z_2 - Y_2^2X_1Z_1.$$

If  $(\pi(X_3), \pi(Y_3), \pi(Z_3)) \neq (0, 0, 0)$  then  $P + Q = [X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3]$ .

(2) Define:

$$X'_3 = Z_2^2X_1Z_1 - Y_1^2X_2Y_2,$$

$$Y'_3 = Y_2^2Y_1Z_1 - aX_1^2X_2Z_2,$$

$$Z'_3 = aX_2^2X_1Y_1 - Z_1^2Y_2Z_2.$$

If  $(\pi(X'_3), \pi(Y'_3), \pi(Z'_3)) \neq (0, 0, 0)$  then  $P + Q = [X'_3 : Y'_3 : Z'_3]$ .

*Proof.* By using [ [4], Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.2 ] we prove the theorem.  $\square$

**Corollary 2.1.**  $(H_{a,d}(R_2), +)$  is a group of unity  $[0 : -1 : 1]$ .

### 3. APPLICATION TWISTED HESSIAN CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY

#### 3.1. Twisted Hessian curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Twisted Hessian curve Diffie-Hellman is a twisted Hessian curve variant of the standard Diffie Hellman algorithm [3]. It is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having a twisted Hessian curve public/private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key. The key, or the derived key, can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher.

##### 3.1.1. Twisted Hessian curve Diffie-Hellman protocol.

Suppose two people Alice and Bob, want to agree upon a key which will be later used for encrypted communication in conjunction with a private key cryptosystem.

One way to establish a secret key using twisted Hessian curve Diffie-Hellman's method is the following:

- Alice and Bob agree on a finite local ring  $R_2$ , a twisted Hessian curve  $H_{a,d}$  defined over it and a point  $P \in H_{a,d}$  such that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) to the base of  $P$  is exponentially hard ( $P$  is the generator point for the curve).
- Alice chooses a secret random integer  $s_A$ , computes  $K_A = (s_A \bmod n)P$  ( $n$  is the order of the curve) and sends  $K_A$  to Bob.
- Bob chooses a secret random integer  $s_B$ , computes  $K_B = (s_B \bmod n)P$  and sends  $K_B$  to Alice.
- Alice computes  $Q = (s_A \bmod n)K_B = (s_A s_B \bmod n)P$ .
- Bob computes  $Q = (s_B \bmod n)K_A = (s_A s_B \bmod n)P$ .
- Their secret common key is then  $Q = (s_A s_B \bmod n)P$ .

Since it is practically impossible to find the private key  $s_A$  or  $s_B$  from the public key  $Q$ . Indeed, if Oscar were able to solve the DLP for the given twisted Hessian curve, than she would be able to extract the integer  $s_A$  from  $K_A = (s_A \bmod n)P$  and simply compute  $Q = (s_A \bmod n)K_B$ . However, there is no known way of solving the Diffie-Hellman problem without solving a discrete logarithm problem in this twisted Hessian curve.

### 3.1.2. Implementation Example.

We consider the twisted Hessian curve over the ring  $R_2$ , which is given by the equation:

$$(1 + \epsilon)X^3 + Y^3 + Z^3 = (1 + \epsilon)XYZ.$$

The twisted Hessian curve  $H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon])$  has 45 elements:

$$H_{1+\epsilon,1+\epsilon}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon]) = \{[0 : 4 : 1], [1 : 0 : 4 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 2 : 3], [1 : 2 : 3\epsilon], [1 : 2 : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 2 : 3 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 2 : 3 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 2 : 4 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 3 : 2], [1 : 4 : 4\epsilon], [1 : 4 : 2 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 4 : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : \epsilon : 4\epsilon], [1 : 2\epsilon : 4 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 3\epsilon : 4 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4\epsilon : 4], [1 : 2\epsilon : 4 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 2 + 2\epsilon : 4], [1 : 2 + 3\epsilon : 4 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 2 + 4\epsilon : 4], [1 : 3\epsilon : 2], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 2], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 4], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 4\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 4 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 4 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 4 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 3\epsilon : 2], [1 : 3 + 4\epsilon : 2], [1 : 4\epsilon : \epsilon], [1 : 4\epsilon : 2 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4\epsilon : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 2\epsilon : 2], [1 : 4 + 2\epsilon : 3\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 2\epsilon : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 3\epsilon : 0], [1 : 4 + 3\epsilon : 2 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 3\epsilon : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 4\epsilon : 2\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 4\epsilon : 3 + 2\epsilon], [\epsilon : 4 + 3\epsilon : 1], [2\epsilon : 4\epsilon : 1], [3\epsilon : 4 + 4\epsilon : 1], [4\epsilon : 4 + 2\epsilon : 1]\}.$$

Let  $P = [1, 2, 3 + \epsilon] \in H_{1+\epsilon,1+\epsilon}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon])$ ,  $P$  is of order 45, so  $P$  is a generator of  $H_{1+\epsilon,1+\epsilon}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon])$ . Thus  $H_{1+\epsilon,1+\epsilon}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon]) = \langle P \rangle$ .

By using the Theorem 2.1 we obtain:

$$4P = [1, 4, 3 + 2\epsilon], 5P = [1, 3 + 2\epsilon, 4 + 3\epsilon], \text{ and } 35P = [1, 3, 2].$$

Suppose two people Alice and Bob want to exchange a secret key in order to communicate:

Alice and Bob each choose an integer modulo  $n = 45$  (the order of the curve  $H_{1+\epsilon,1+\epsilon}(\mathbb{F}_5[\epsilon])$ ) for example;  $s_A = 49$  for Alice and  $s_B = 80$  for Bob.

We have  $[s_A] = 4 \bmod 45$  and  $[s_B] = 35 \bmod 45$ , so:

- Alice calculates  $[s_A]P = 4P = [1, 4, 3 + 2\epsilon]$  and sends it to Bob.
- Bob calculates  $[s_B]P = 35P = [1, 3, 2]$  and sends it to Alice.
- Their secret key is then:

$$K = ([s_A s_B])P = [3920]P = 5P = [1, 3 + 2\epsilon, 4 + 3\epsilon].$$

### 3.2. Encryption and decryption of a message in $H_{a,d}(R_2)$ .

Let  $H_{a,d}(R_2)$  be the twisted Hessian curve over the ring  $R_2$  such that  $a = 1 + 2\epsilon$  and  $d = 2 + \epsilon$ .

The twisted Hessian curve  $H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon])$  has 99 elements:

$$H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon]) = \{[0 : 10 : 1], [1 : 0 : 10 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 3 : 10 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 4 : 7 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 7 : 4 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 8 : 10 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 10 : 10\epsilon], [1 : 10 : 3 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 10 : 8 + 8\epsilon], [1 : \epsilon : 10 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 2\epsilon : 10 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 3\epsilon : 10 + \epsilon], [1 : 4\epsilon : 10 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 5\epsilon : 10 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 6\epsilon : 10 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 7\epsilon : 10 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 8\epsilon : 10 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 9\epsilon : 10 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 10\epsilon : 10], [1 : 3 + \epsilon : 10 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 2\epsilon : 10 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 3\epsilon : 10 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 4\epsilon : 10], [1 : 3 + 5\epsilon : 10 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 6\epsilon : 10 + \epsilon], [1 : 3 + 7\epsilon : 10 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 8\epsilon : 10 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 9\epsilon : 10 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 3 + 10\epsilon : 10 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 4 + \epsilon : 7 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 2\epsilon : 7 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 3\epsilon : 7 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 4\epsilon : 7], [1 : 4 + 5\epsilon : 7 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 6\epsilon : 7 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 7\epsilon : 7 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 8\epsilon : 7 + \epsilon], [1 : 4 + 9\epsilon : 7 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 4 + 10\epsilon : 7 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 7 + \epsilon : 4 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 2\epsilon : 4 + \epsilon], [1 : 7 + 3\epsilon : 4 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 4\epsilon : 4 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 5\epsilon : 4 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 6\epsilon : 4 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 7\epsilon : 4 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 8\epsilon : 4 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 9\epsilon : 4 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 7 + 10\epsilon : 4], [1 : 8 + \epsilon : 10 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 2\epsilon : 10 + \epsilon], [1 : 8 + 3\epsilon : 10 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 4\epsilon : 10 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 5\epsilon : 10 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 6\epsilon : 10 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 7\epsilon : 10 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 8\epsilon : 10], [1 : 8 + 9\epsilon : 10 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 8 + 10\epsilon : 10 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 10 + \epsilon : 3\epsilon], [1 : 10 + \epsilon : 3 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 10 + \epsilon : 8 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 2\epsilon : 7\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 2\epsilon : 3 + 8\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 2\epsilon : 8 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 3\epsilon : 0], [1 : 10 + 3\epsilon : 3 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 3\epsilon : 8 + \epsilon], [1 : 10 + 4\epsilon : 4\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 4\epsilon : 3 + \epsilon], [1 : 10 + 4\epsilon : 8 + 6\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 5\epsilon : 8], [1 : 10 + 5\epsilon : 8\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 5\epsilon : 3 + 3\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 6\epsilon : \epsilon], [1 : 10 + 6\epsilon : 3 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 6\epsilon : 8 + 5\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 7\epsilon : 5\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 7\epsilon : 3 + 7\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 7\epsilon : 8 + 10\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 8\epsilon : 9\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 8\epsilon : 3 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 8\epsilon : 8 + 4\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 9\epsilon : 3], [1 : 10 + 9\epsilon : 2\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 9\epsilon : 8 + 9\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 10\epsilon : 6\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 10\epsilon : 3 + 2\epsilon], [1 : 10 + 10\epsilon : 8 + 3\epsilon], [\epsilon : 10 + 7\epsilon : 1], [2\epsilon : 10 + 3\epsilon : 1], [3\epsilon : 10 + 10\epsilon : 1], [4\epsilon : 10 + 6\epsilon : 1], [5\epsilon : 10 + 2\epsilon : 1], [6\epsilon : 10 + 9\epsilon : 1], [7\epsilon : 10 + 5\epsilon : 1], [8\epsilon : 10 + \epsilon : 1], [9\epsilon : 10 + 8\epsilon : 1], [10\epsilon : 10 + 4\epsilon : 1]\}.$$

Let  $P = [1, 7 + 6\epsilon, 4 + 6\epsilon] \in H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon])$ ,  $P$  is of order 99, so  $P$  is a generator of  $H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon])$ . Thus  $H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon]) = \langle P \rangle$ .

We will use the group  $H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon])$  to encrypt and decrypt messages, and we denote  $G = H_{a,d}(\mathbb{F}_{11}[\epsilon])$ .

### 3.3. Coding of elements of $G$ .

We will code each number  $a \in \{0, 1, \dots, 9\}$  by  $0a$  and the number 10 by 10.

We will give a code to each element  $Q = mP \in G$ , where  $m \in 1, \dots, 99$  defined as it follows:

- If  $Q = [1, y_0 + y_1\epsilon, z_0 + z_1\epsilon]$ , where  $y_0, y_1, z_0, z_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{11}$ , then  $Q = 01y_0y_1z_0z_1$ .
- If  $Q = [x\epsilon, y_0 + y_1\epsilon, 1]$ , where  $y_0, y_1, x \in \mathbb{F}_{11}$ , then  $Q = 00xy_0y_101$ .

We also attach any element  $Q \in G$  with a letter of the alphabet or a punctuation sign and we assemble the results in the following table:

TABLE 1. Table of codes

m	mP	Code mP	Symbol	m	mP	Code mP	Symbol
1	[1, 7 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0107060406	a	2	[1, 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 3 + $\epsilon$ ]	0110040301	b
3	[1, 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0110040004	c	4	[1, 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0110090809	d
5	[1, 8 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0108061004	e	6	[1, 3 $\epsilon$ , 10 + $\epsilon$ ]	0100031001	f
7	[1, 3 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0103021010	g	8	[1, 4, 7 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0104000710	h
9	[10 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0010100801	i	10	[1, 7 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 4 + $\epsilon$ ]	0107020401	j
11	[1, 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 3]	0110090300	k	12	[1, 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0110070005	l
13	[1, 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 8 + $\epsilon$ ]	0110030801	m	14	[1, 8 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0108031010	n
15	[1, 2 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0100021009	o	16	[1, 3 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0103031005	p
17	[1, 4 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0104050703	q	18	[9 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0009100501	r
19	[1, 7 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0107090407	s	20	[1, 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0110030310	t
21	[1, 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0110100006	u	22	[1, 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0110080804	v
23	[1, 8, 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0108001005	w	24	[1, $\epsilon$ , 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0100011006	x
25	[1, 3 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 10]	0103041000	y	26	[1, 4 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0104100707	z
27	[8 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0008100201	0	28	[1, 7 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0107050402	1
29	[1, 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0110080309	2	30	[1, 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0110020007	3
31	[1, 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0110020807	4	32	[1, 8 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 10]	0108081000	5
33	[1, 0, 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0100001003	6	34	[1, 3 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0103051006	7
35	[1, 4 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 7]	0104040700	8	36	[7 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0007101001	9
37	[1, 7 + $\epsilon$ , 4 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0107010408	space	38	[1, 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0110020308	A
39	[1, 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0110050008	B	40	[1, 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0110070810	C
41	[1, 8 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0108051006	D	42	[1, 10 $\epsilon$ , 10]	0100101000	E
43	[1, 3 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 10 + $\epsilon$ ]	0103061001	F	44	[1, 4 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0104090704	G
45	[6 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0006100701	H	46	[1, 7 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0107080403	I
47	[1, 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0110070307	J	48	[1, 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0110080009	K
49	[1, 10 + $\epsilon$ , 8 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0110010802	L	50	[1, 8 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 10 + $\epsilon$ ]	0108021001	M
51	[1, 9 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0100091008	N	52	[1, 3 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0103071007	O
53	[1, 4 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0104030708	P	54	[5 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0005100401	Q
55	[1, 7 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0107040409	R	56	[1, 10 + $\epsilon$ , 3 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0110010306	S

m	mP	Code mP	Sym- bol	m	mP	Code mP	Sym- bol
57	[1, 10, 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0110000010	T	58	[1, 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0110060805	U
59	[1, 8 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0108101007	V	60	[1, 8 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0100081005	W
61	[1, 3 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0103081002	X	62	[1, 4 + 8 $\epsilon$ , 7 + $\epsilon$ ]	0104080701	Y
63	[4 $\epsilon$ , 10 + $\epsilon$ , 1]	0004100101	Z	64	[1, 7, 4 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0107000404	.
65	[1, 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0110060305	:	66	[1, 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 0]	0110030000	;
67	[1, 10, 8 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0110000808	,	68	[1, 8 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0108071002	?
69	[1, 7 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0100071002	+	70	[1, 3 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0103091008	-
71	[1, 4 + 2 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0104020705	$\times$	72	[3 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0003100901	$\div$
73	[1, 7 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0107070410	=	74	[1, 10, 3 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0110000304	*
75	[1, 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ , $\epsilon$ ]	0110060001	$\alpha$	76	[1, 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 8]	0110050800	$\beta$
77	[1, 8 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 8 $\epsilon$ ]	0108041008	$\gamma$	78	[1, 6 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ ]	0100061010	$\delta$
79	[1, 3 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0103101003	$\epsilon$	80	[1, 4 + 7 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0104070709	$\varepsilon$
81	[2 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0002100601	$\zeta$	82	[1, 7 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 4 + 5 $\epsilon$ ]	0107030405	$\eta$
83	[1, 10 + 5 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0110050303	$\theta$	84	[1, 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0110090002	$\lambda$
85	[1, 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0110100803	$\mu$	86	[1, 8 + $\epsilon$ , 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0108011003	(
87	[1, 5 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 7 $\epsilon$ ]	0100051007	)	88	[1, 3, 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0103001009	$\pi$
89	[1, 4 + $\epsilon$ , 7 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0104010702	$\tau$	90	[ $\epsilon$ , 10 + 3 $\epsilon$ , 1]	0001100301	$\phi$
91	[1, 7 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 4]	0107100400	$\varphi$	92	[1, 10 + 10 $\epsilon$ , 3 + 2 $\epsilon$ ]	0110100302	$\psi$
93	[1, 10 + $\epsilon$ , 3 $\epsilon$ ]	0110010003	$\omega$	94	[1, 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ , 8 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0110040806	[
95	[1, 8 + 9 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 9 $\epsilon$ ]	0108091009	]	96	[1, 4 $\epsilon$ , 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0100041004	
97	[1, 3 + $\epsilon$ , 10 + 4 $\epsilon$ ]	0103011004	{	98	[1, 4 + 6 $\epsilon$ , 7 + 6 $\epsilon$ ]	0104060706	}
99	[0, 10, 1]	0000100001	/				

### 3.3.1. Encryption of a message.

Let the following message:

"Twisted Hessian curves are well suited to public key cryptography. They replace calculations on integers, or in  $Z/nZ$  groups, with calculations in groups associated with a twisted Hessian curve."

Its encryption is:

"011000001001080010050010100801010709040701100303100108061004011009080901070104  
 08000610070101080610040107090407010709040700101008010107060406010803101001070104  
 08011004000401101000060009100501011008080401080610040107090407010701040801070604  
 06000910050101080610040107010408010800100501080610040110070005011007000501070104

08010709040701101000060010100801011003031001080610040110090809010701040801100303  
 10010002100901070104080103031005011010000601100403010110070005001010080101100400  
 04010701040801100903000108061004010304100001070104080110040004000910050101030410  
 00010303100501100303100100021009010302101000091005010107060406010303100501040007  
 10010304100001070004040107010408011000001001040007100108061004010304100001070104  
 08000910050101080610040103031005011007000501070604060110040004010806100401070104  
 08011004000401070604060110070005011004000401101000060110070005010706040601100303  
 10001010080101000210090108031010010709040701070104080100021009010803101001070104  
 08001010080101080310100110030310010806100401030210100108061004000910050101070904  
 0701100008080107010408010002100900091005010107010408001010803101001070104  
 0800041001010000100001010803101000410010101070104080103021010000910050101000210  
 09011010000601030310050107090407011000080801070104080108001005001010080101100303  
 10010400071001070104080110040004010706040601100700050110040004011010000601100700  
 05010706040601100303100010100801010002100901080310100107090407010701040800101008  
 01010803101001070104080103021010000910050101000210090110100006010303100501070904  
 07010701040801070604060107090407010709040701000210090110040004001010080101070604  
 06011003031001080610040110090809010701040801080010050010100801011003031001040007  
 10010701040801070604060107010408011003031001080010050010100801010709040701100303  
 10010806100401100908090107010408000610070101080610040107090407010709040700101008  
 01010706040601080310100107010408011004000401101000060009100501011008080401080610  
 040107000404”

### 3.3.2. Decryption of a message.

Let the following message:

”010708040301080310100107010408011003031001040007100010100801010709040701070104  
 08010303100501070604060103031005010806100400091005010110000808010701040801080010  
 05010806100401070104080103021010001010080101100808040108061004010701040801070604  
 06010803101001070104080108061004010001100601070604060110030801010303100501100700  
 05010806100401070104080100021009010003100101070104080107060406010303100501030310  
 05011007000500101008010110040004010706040601100303100010100801010002100901080310  
 10010701040801100303100104000710010806100401070104080110030310010800100500101008  
 01010709040701100303100108061004011009080901070104080006100701010806100401070904  
 07010709040700101008010107060406010803101001070104080110040004011010000600091005  
 01011008080401080610040107090407010701040801000210090110080804010806100400091005  
 01010701040801070604060107010408011007000501000210090110040004010706040601100700

05010701040800091005010010100801010803101001030210100107010408001010080101080310  
 10010701040801100400040009100501010304100001030310050110030310010002100901030210  
 10000910050101070604060103031005010400071001030410000107000404"

Its decryption is:

"In this paper, we give an example of application the twisted Hessian curves over a local ring in cryptography."

#### 4. CONCLUSION

With this example, we can encrypt and decrypt any message of any length. This application is implemented by Maple.

#### REFERENCES

- [1] A. GRINI, A. CHILLALI, L. ELFADIL, H. MOUANIS: *Twisted Hessian curves over the ring  $F_q[e]$ ,  $e^2 = 0$* , International Journal of Computer Aided Engineering and Technology, to appear.
- [2] A. GRINI, A. CHILLALI, H. MOUANIS: *The Binary Operations Calculus in  $H_{a,d}^2$* , Boletim da Sociedade Paranaense de Matemática, , to appear.
- [3] W. DIFFIE, M. E. HELLMAN: *New Directions in Cryptography*, NSF Grant ENG10173, 1976.
- [4] D. J. BERNSTEIN, C. CHUENGSATIANSUP, D. KOHEL, T. LANGE: *Twisted Hessian Curves*, In LATINCRIPT 2015, pages 269-294, 2015. <http://cr.ypt.to/papers.html#hessian>.

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, FACULTY OF SCIENCE DHAR EL MAHRAZ-FEZ  
 UNIVERSITY OF S. M.BEN ABDELLAH FEZ, MOROCCO  
 P.O. BOX 1796 ATLAS-FEZ MOROCCO  
*Email address:* abdelali.grini@usmba.ac.ma

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, FP, LSI, TAZA  
 UNIVERSITY OF S. M.BEN ABDELLAH FEZ, MOROCCO  
 P.O. BOX 1796 ATLAS-FEZ MOROCCO  
*Email address:* abdelhakim.chillali@usmba.ac.ma

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, FACULTY OF SCIENCE DHAR EL MAHRAZ-FEZ  
 UNIVERSITY OF S. M.BEN ABDELLAH FEZ, MOROCCO  
 P.O. BOX 1796 ATLAS-FEZ MOROCCO  
*Email address:* hmouanis@yahoo.fr